Most of us have sometime or the other, hailed a cycle-rickshaw and very few of us, if any, have ever bothered to stop and think of a rickshaw as anything more than just another mode of transport. Indeed, in our daily lives, we regularly use human labour to ease our tasks – be it the porter at the railway station or the maid-servant in our home. In an economic sense, these occupations are perfectly legitimate – an example of market forces at work. Apologists argue that this is inevitable in a poor country like India with not enough jobs to go around; some even insist that this is an indication of a thriving market economy – one that absorbs millions of people who would otherwise be unemployed.

However, these professions raise a more fundamental, even disturbing question – is it morally acceptable for a society to allow professions that are clearly inhuman, possibly even cruel? Given the economic conditions in third world countries, questions of economic morality may seem irrelevant. There is obviously an abundant supply of labour, especially for very low-paying occupations that demand little or no skills – from rickshaw-pulling to servants at home - forming the bulwark of the third world economies. Free-market advocates insist that this is a natural phenomenon in labour markets with low skill levels and that the alternative to this would be millions of jobless, ‘unproductive’ people.

The economic rationale, however, must be squared with social objectives, and here lies the dilemma. Should there be a concept of ‘individual economic rights’ which would protect human beings from having to take up ‘inhuman’ occupations? And who is best placed to determine and enforce ‘morally acceptable economic activities’?

For over half a century, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ratified by the United Nations, has provided the foundation for civil and political rights. Several organizations around the world, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to name a couple, have grown around the principles enshrined in these rights. On ‘economic rights’, however, there has been no such consensus. There has been an ‘International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights’ which has been around since the 1960s. Not surprisingly, much of the developed world is yet to ratify this and very few governments pay any heed, if at all, to this covenant.

One reason has been that this goes against the very foundation of capitalism. Capitalism advocates that the marketplace is the best enforcer as well as the judge of economic rights. In this view, it seems sacrilegious to even speak of ‘economic rights’. Conventional wisdom dictates that it is perfectly acceptable to speak of the ‘right to vote’ (a civil right) but the ‘right to work’ or say, the ‘right to eat’ (economic rights) sound ‘socialist’, and therefore, not as acceptable.

Prof. Amartya Sen has argued that democratic rights (like the right to vote) give people the power over their governments – power which does not allow the government to allow man-made catastrophes like famines to occur. It might be true that democratic rights prevent such extreme conditions, but the question is – can they guarantee economic rights? More importantly, can they guarantee freedom from exploitation? Economic exploitation is prevalent, if not rampant, even in democratically governed societies, often with the open approval of the voters. For instance, the West Bengal government has tried, on several occasions, to ban the human-rickshaws in Calcutta, but has had to retract due to pressure from the rickshaw-pullers. Likewise, many third-world governments, from Honduras to Bangladesh, have preferred to turn a blind-eye towards the sweat-shop employers, mainly because they are a major source of employment and precious foreign exchange.

Obviously, democratic governance is not enough to guarantee proper working conditions. It is clear that neither market capitalism nor political democracy provides the right answers – in fact, capitalism appear to encourage such exploitative behavior, driven by the exigencies of the marketplace.

The objective should be to make the users of these services pay the ‘economic cost’ of the labour, which should include long-term costs (e.g. the health impact of intensely physical jobs like rickshaw-pulling).
What then, might be a solution? If societies around the world have by and large, come to agree on social rights, it should be possible to determine related economic rights. As a starting point, it is imperative for nations to define the ‘economic rights’ for individuals. Economic rights would not only include a ‘right to work’ or a ‘right to eat’ (which would translate to the government providing some kind of economic support for people who cannot find any form of employment) but would also include a ‘right against exploitation’. Under this, it should be possible to identify employment opportunities which are exploitative and over a period, outlaw them, on the lines of the abolition of slavery.

Such regulations are easier in the formal sector, than in the unorganized areas of the economy. The rickshaw-pullers, maid-servants, construction workers, etc. are subject to exploitation outside the mainstream economic and legal systems. Within regulated environments, it might be feasible to impose some kind of an ‘exploitation tax’, creating disincentives for those who employ (and exploit) such forms of labour. At the same time, bringing them into the formal sector would enable the government to provide a safety-net for the people who are liable to be affected most by such measures. Likewise, they could be encouraged to set-up co-operatives or unions (as porters in some of the larger railway stations have managed to do). These could then give them collective bargaining rights (e.g. in case of cycle-rickshaws, standardize rates by using ‘meters’, like taxis and auto-rickshaws) as also help build awareness among them regarding their ‘economic rights’.

It has proven futile to impose a ban on economic activities involving inhuman labour in cities and towns around the country. The objective should be to make the users of these services pay the ‘economic cost’ of the labour, which should include long-term costs (e.g. the health impact of intensely physical jobs like rickshaw-pulling). The focus should be on drawing people into the domain of the formal sector and then ‘to arm’ them with economic rights that expand their choices.

This is a daunting task; especially when an overwhelming percentage of the work force is outside the formal sector. The role of watchdog agencies can be especially useful in focusing the attention of citizens on these issues. Just as it took a long and arduous journey to embody the concept of civil rights in social policy, it will probably take a long time and many ideological battles to incorporate economic rights as an integral part of public policy. A determined beginning, however, must be made. o