Enhancing women's representation in legislatures
Most countries in the world have failed to give due space
and representation to women in their political life. Women are moving in
the direction of near equal participation in only a handful of countries,
such as Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. In these societies
women have begun to seriously alter the very nature of politics, making
enduring, and substantial gains in every field. However, in all other countries,
including the supposedly advanced democracies of western Europe and North
America, where women exercise certain freedoms and have acquired the wherewithal
for economic independence, female presence in legislatures remains small
and relatively insignificant.
In India the problem for women is more serious for several
reasons:
There were many more outstanding women leaders and workers
in the Congress Party at all levels during the freedom movement than are
at present in all parties put together. In states like Maharashtra and
Gujarat, virtually every neighbourhood and most villages could boast of
at least one effective woman leader, even into the 1950s. But as politics
became more centralised as well as criminalised, thus undermining all other
institutions of civil society, women were pushed out of leadership positions
to function on the margins, at best relegated to the domain of social work
at the local level. Even that tradition eroded from the 1970s onward.
The set back to women's participation is even more severe
at the state level than in Lok Sabha (See Tables
1
and
2).
This is clearly evident in Bihar, which had 14 women elected to the Vidhan
Sabha in 1952, 31 women in 1957, and 26 women in 1962. But in the 1967
elections, women won only 11 seats. Their number declined to 4 in 1969.
Thereafter, it reached a plateau, levelling at a mere 13 during the last
state assembly elections.
The representation of women in the Lok Sabha has basically
remained stagnant. It reached a "high" of 8 percent in 1984. This figure
has not been crossed since then. Thereafter, it has showed some decline
rather than register an increase. This despite the fact that every major
national party in recent years has declared through their manifestos that
they would implement a 33 percent reservation for women in all legislatures.
One of the most puzzling features of this depressed level
of women's political representation in our legislative bodies is that it
seems to have no direct correlation with literacy and other seemingly related
indicators. A comparison between the states of Kerala and Rajasthan, whose
literacy rates are at opposite ends of the spectrum, demonstrates this
clearly. In Kerala, the overall literacy rate is reportedly 90 percent,
with 86 percent female literacy. By contrast, in Rajasthan, female literacy
is a mere 20 percent and only 12 percent of females are literate in rural
areas. Kerala has a matrilineal tradition in which women have a much larger
measure of autonomy and freedom of movement. Kerala's women also tend to
marry at a much later age compared to women in other states. Most women
in Rajasthan live far more restricted lives in aggressively patriarchal
communities that still practise purdah and perform child marriages.
But the cultural and educational advantage that women in Kerala have, does
not translate into higher political participation as compared to Rajasthan.
The percentage of women in the legislative assemblies of both states is
low. In Kerala it rose from less than one percent in 1967 to six percent
in 1991. However, in Rajasthan, the representation of women was four percent
in 1967 and reached eight percent in 1985-90, slightly more than in Kerala,
but not significantly greater. Since then it has been going down.
Similarly, the state of Manipur, which has a tradition
of women playing a dominant role in both the family and the community (again
due to a matrilineal heritage), never produced a single woman legislator
till 1990 — when it elected its first. Nagaland and other North-eastern
states which have less repressive cultures for women have similarly low
levels of women's representation. By contrast, take the proportion of women
in politics in UP, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh. Though these states are known
for their low education levels and repressive cultural norms for women,
they have not only sent a relatively larger proportion of women to the
Lok Sabha than those from the North-east, but have also elected relatively
more female MLAs.
In independent India, pervasive gender discrimination
has resulted in sidelining even veteran women politicians. It is difficult
for women to establish a foothold without patronage from powerful men in
the party – that too through close personal relations, as wives, daughters
and sisters. This is indeed a matter for serious concern because the level
of political participation among women in any society acts as a reliable
barometer of the health of its democracy.
It is significant that stagnation and/or decline in women's
political participation rates run contrary to trends in many other fields.
Women in India have made major inroads in various male-dominated
professions, including the governmental bureaucracy. In the fields of business,
medicine, engineering, law, art, and culture, women who were given opportunities
to acquire the necessary skills and education have proven themselves capable
of holding their own, without availing of any special measures to facilitate
their entry. But they have failed to gain ground in the field of politics.
Moreover, the agenda of women's empowerment seems to have lost the kind
of moral and political legitimacy it enjoyed during the freedom movement,
as was evident from the ugly scenes in the aftermath of tabling the Women's
Reservation Bill in parliament. Such a response would have been inconceivable
in the India of the 1920s to the 1940s.
All these trends indicate that women's representation
in politics requires special consideration, and cannot be left to the forces
that presently dominate our parties and government. Today, even the best
of our female parliamentarians feel sidelined and powerless within their
respective parties. The few women in leadership positions have not been
able to encourage the entry of greater numbers of women in electoral and
party politics, and are an ineffective minority within their own respective
political groupings.
The very same male party leaders who compete with each
other in announcing their support of special reservations for women have
shown little willingness to include women in party decision-making, or
even to help create a conducive atmosphere for women's participation in
their own organisations. In fact, women's marginalisation is even more
pronounced in the day-to-day functioning of almost all political parties
than in the Lok Sabha. Therefore, it is urgently required that we take
special measures to enhance women's political participation in ways that
help them influence decision-making at all levels of our society and polity.
Our democracy will remain seriously flawed if it fails to yield adequate
space to women.
Given this worrisome scenario, the national debate and
efforts to provide constitutional and legal mechanisms to enhance women's
participation in legislatures are welcome and long-overdue.
Problems with the Present Bill
The 85th constitutional Amendment Bill, introduced in
Lok Sabha in December 1999, includes the following key provisions:
(i) One-third of all seats in Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas
shall be reserved for women.
(ii) Such reservation shall also apply in case of seats
reserved for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs).
(iii) There shall be rotation of seats so reserved for
women.
(iv) Such rotation shall be determined by draw of lots,
in such a manner that a seat shall be reserved only once in a block of
three general elections.
This Bill is seriously flawed, insofar as it mechanically
provides for entry of women members to fill one-third of vacancies in Lok
Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas. Such mechanical reservation and rotation suffers
from serious defects:
1. One-third seats are reserved, and such reserved seats
are rotated in every general election. This rotation will automatically
result in two-thirds of incumbent members being forcibly unseated in every
general election; the remaining one-third will be left in limbo until the
last moment, not knowing whether or not their constituency will form part
of the one-third randomly reserved seats and thus require them to scramble
at short notice to find another seat to contest.
2. There is already resentment about reserved seats for
SCs and STs being frozen in the same constituencies over a long period
of time. Inevitably, there will be vociferous and justified demands for
rotation of seats reserved for scheduled castes, and in some cases scheduled
tribes, where their population may not be very large. This will trigger
off further instability in our polity.
3. The population of scheduled casts and scheduled tribes
is now estimated to be around 16 percent and 8 percent respectively, on
an all India basis. In certain states, their combined population is much
higher, reaching 35 percent or more. In the event of rotation of all reserved
seats (women plus SCs, STs) with one-third seats reserved for women, every
single seat will be rotated in every general election. This means that
practically every member of a legislature will be unseated in every single
general election (See
Table 3 and Pie Chart).
4. Such compulsory unseating violates the very basic principles
of democratic representation. It jeopardizes the possibility of sensible
planning to contest and nurture a political constituency for both male
and female candidates.
5. As legislators do not have the incentive to seekre-election
from the same constituency, plunder will increase, and politics will be
even more predatory and unaccountable. This will contribute to a more unstable
political process, and make it difficult for women to build their long
term credibility as effective representatives, since they will not be able
to contest twice from the same constituency.
6. If seats are reserved exclusively for women in every
election through territorial constituencies, voters in such reserved constituencies
would have no choice but to elect women only, violating the basic principles
of democratic representation.
7. In such a situation, there is likely to be greater
resentment against women, undermining the very objective of the Bill. Those
men who get pushed out of their constituencies or who see their allies
sidelined will either sabotage female contenders in revenge, or spend much
of their political capital helping their own female relatives in cornering
these reserved seats. Such proxies would be expected to keep the seat "safe"
for the men until the next election, when they would again try to reclaim
their seats. Such women would lack legitimacy in the eyes of the voters.
8. Women elected in reserved constituencies will be contesting
against other women only, and will lack the legitimacy and opportunity
needed to prove their ability and acceptability. Leadership acquired in
such a manner will be seen as unnatural, artificial and foisted.
9. Women legislators, when elected, will not be able to
nurse their constituencies on a long-term basis, and thus will be deprived
of a strong political base and will forever be regarded as lightweight
politicians. This in effect will make their presence in legislatures ornamental,
and will not lead to a more effective participation in politics.
10. This Bill does not address the more fundamental issue
of inadequate participation of women in politics and their much greater
marginalisation within the political parties.
11. The experience of fixed quotas in a few countries
where it has been tried, such as Nepal, the Philippines, and the erstwhile
Soviet Union, has not produced very successful results for women's political
participation.
12. While this Bill provides for election of SC and ST
women as legislators, it does not adequately address the issue of participation
of backward castes (BCs) and minorities. As parties have no choice about
the seats reserved for women, they will be unable to nominate women candidates
from these under represented sections in constituencies where they stand
a reasonable chance of success.
13. Even though there will be no legal bar on women standing
from general constituencies, it is highly unlikely that any women will
obtain party tickets to run for office outside the reserved constituencies.
This same pattern is evident with SCs and STs who have been permanently
ghettoised to fixed reserved constituencies.
14. This Bill is completely silent about women's representation
in Rajya Sabha and Legislative Councils. Given these serious infirmities,
it is necessary to design better models for enhancing women's representation
in legislatures. Therefore, we present an alternate model which will address
many of the flaws listed above.
The Proposed Alternative Women's Reservation Bill
THE important provisions of the proposed Alternative Bills
are as follows..
1. A law should be enacted amending The Representation
of the People Act, 1951, to make it mandatory for every recognised political
party to nominate women candidates for election in one-third of the constituencies.
2. Each party can choose where it wishes to nominate women
candidates, duly taking local political and social factors into account.
3. Among seats reserved for SCs and STs also, one-third
of the candidates nominated by recognised parties shall be women.
4. To prevent a party from nominating women candidates
only in states or constituencies where the party's chances of winning election
are weak, and to ensure an even spread of women candidates, the unit for
consideration (the unit in which at least one out of three party candidates
shall be a woman) for the Lok Sabha shall be a state or union territory;
for the State Legislative Assembly, the unit shall be a cluster of three
contiguous Lok Sabha constituencies.
5. In the event of any recognised party failing to nominate
one-third women candidates, for the shortfall of every single woman candidate,
two male candidates of the party shall lose the party symbol and affiliation
and all the recognition-related advantages.
6. A law amending Articles 80 and 171 of the Constitution
should be enacted providing for women's reservation of one-third of the
seats, elected or nominated, to Rajya Sabha or Legislative Councils. Corresponding
amendments need to be made in the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution and,
the Representation of the People Act, 1950.
Advantages of this Model
1. Parties will be free to choose their female candidates
and constituencies depending on local political and social factors. Parties
will nurture women candidates where they can offer a good fight rather
than in pre-fixed lottery based constituencies, where they may or may not
have viable women candidates. Thus there is flexibility and promotion of
natural leadership.
2. Though seats are not reserved, there will be a large
pool of credible and serious women candidates in the fray. This is so because
the real contest in elections is only among candidates nominated by recognised
parties. Table 4
clearly shows that the role of Independents in our elections is marginal
and declining. In Lok Sabha elections, as many as 99.7 percent of Independents
are in fact losing their caution deposits.
3. A woman candidate will be contesting both against female
and/or male candidates of rival parties. Therefore, the democratic choice
of voters is not restricted to compulsorily electing only women candidates.
4. As women members are elected in competition with other
candidates – without reserving seats – they will be seen as legitimate
representatives in the eyes of the public and not just beneficiaries of
charitable measures.
5. A winning woman candidate will have been elected on
her own strength, backed by party support. She will not be a mere proxy
or political lightweight.
6. There will be no need for rotation of reservation.
Therefore the elected women and men can nurture their constituencies and
emerge as major political figures in their own right, with an independent
power base.
7. At the same time, in the absence of reserved seats,
there will be healthy competition for nomination for a particular seat
between male and female politicians.
8. Parties will be able to nominate women from BCs, minorities
and other communities for elective office in areas where there is electoral
advantage to them. This obviates the need for a quota within quotas – an
issue which has blocked the existing bill. Those who are concerned about
BC representation need not settle merely for one-third quota for BC women
within the 33 percent women's quota as they are demanding now. They can
field as many BC or minority women as they think appropriate.
9. This method is mostly likely to find favour with political
parties and incumbent legislators, as there will be no fear of being uprooted
at short notice by draw of lots. Both compulsory reservation and regular
rotation are avoided.
10. Unlike with the lottery system of reserved constituencies,
in which women's presence is likely to get ossified at 33 percent since
there would be resistance to letting women contest from non-reserved constituencies,
this model allows for far greater flexibility in the number and proportion
of women being elected to legislatures. If women are candidates for one-third
of all seats contested by each party, theoretically they could even win
the vast majority of seats – all on merit.
11. This model also provides for reservation ofseats for
women in the upper houses.
However, given the present state of affairs, it is likely
that, to begin with, about one-third of the contested seats will be won
by women. But this percentage is likely to grow over time as women gain
more confidence and strength. It also ensures that their presence in legislatures
more nearly reflects their actual electoral strength so that they are not
seen as mere recipients of charitable measures.
Plugging Possible Loopholes
1. A party may be tempted to nominate women from constituencies
where it is weak. However, by making the unit of consideration the state
or union territory for Lok Sabha, and a cluster of three Lok Sabha constituencies
for the Legislative Assembly, this risk is avoided. Parties will be compelled
to nominate women in all states and regions. No serious party seeking power
can afford to deliberately undermine its own chances of election on such
a large scale. It is also mandatory to nominate women in one-third constituencies
because otherwise twice the number of male candidates of the party will
lose party nomination.
2. In the absence of actual reservation of seats, there
could be fears that women may not be elected in one-third constituencies,
as the voters may prefer a male candidate over a female candidate on account
of gender bias. However, evidence so far suggests that women candidates
of parties have not suffered any gender discrimination at the hands of
voters. In fact, very often, the percentage of success of woman candidates
is higher than that of male candidates. Table
5 shows that the success rate of women candidates in Lok
Sabha elections has been uniformly higher than that of their male counterparts
in every general elections. It is possible to argue that the few women
who contest are more often party candidates, and therefore, their success
rate is exaggerated. However, Table
6 clearly shows that even among candidates of recognised
political parties, the success rate of women candidates is higher than
that of men. While 32.53 per cent of women candidates of recognised parties
have been elected to Lok Sabha since 1984, the success rate of male candidates
is only 26.50 percent. This trend is seen in all general elections since
1984, except in 1989. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that women
will be elected in large numbers, and that, in fact, their presence in
Lok Sabha will exceed one-third in many cases. In any case, past evidence
suggests that in at least a quarter of the constituencies, women are likely
to get elected if recognised parties nominate them in at least one-third
constituencies.
It is noteworthy that women's participation has increased
dramatically, to near equal or even higher than equal participation, only
in countries like Sweden, Denmark, Finiland, Germany and the Netherlands
which have implemented party-based quotas of the kind we are proposing.
Other Necessary Measures For Enhancing Women's Participation
While it is necessary to institute a system of reservation
for women as spelt out above, this or any other system of ensuring women's
presence in legislatures is not by itself sufficient if our objective is
to make women equal partners in democratic politics. The problem is not
just that women in the political arena are denied tickets by political
parties. The fundamental problem is that given the nature of electoral
politics today, the system itself creates insurmountable obstacles for
women. Proposals for reservation for women must therefore be a part of
a larger package of general reforms in electoral politics.
The following general measures of electoral reform would
go a long way towards making politics less intimidating for women.
1. Measures to check criminalisation of politics:
(a) The list of offences where a conviction leads to
disqualification from contesting election should be expanded as per the
recommendations of the Law Commission.
(b) Disqualification should not be conditional upon final
conviction. It should come into operation as soon as the judge has framed
charges with references to offences specified above.
(c) A candidate should be required to make a declaration
of all the cases pending against him or her, involving charges of criminal
(a) Rules governing the membership of party and a Register
of Current Members that is open for inspection by any member or the representatives
of the Election Commission of India.
(b) Provisions for a periodic and democratic election
of all the office bearers and the highest executive body by the members
of the party.
Procedures for selection of party's candidates for
elections to legislatures.
(d) Procedures for deciding upon various policy documents
including the party's election manifesto.
(e) Internal mechanism for adjudicating any dispute, including
those concerning the interpretation of the party constitution.
(f) The Election Commission shall review the party constitutions
for their compliance with the above mentioned requirements, and also serve
as a court of final appeal against any decision of the internal adjudicating
authority in every party. The failure to comply with the Election Commission's
instructions or decisions will invite de-recognition of the party.
(a) Every candidate shall make a declaration of his/her
income and property at the time of nomination. False or incomplete declaration
shall invite disqualification.
(b) All citizens and corporations shall be exempted, upto
a certain limit, from paying income tax on donations made to registered
political parties.
(c) The candidates and political parties shall be required,
after the completion of election, to file a detailed statement of account.
Non-disclosure or false declaration should result in disqualification for
candidate and de-registration for political parties.
(d) While the current ceiling on electoral expenses needs
to be revised, certain items of expenditure (direct inducements in cash
or kind to the voter, or expenditure to bribe officials or hire hoodlums)
shall be considered illegal.
(e) Every candidate who secures 2 percent or more of the
valid votes polled in a constituency shall be reimbursed a reasonable sum
of, say Rs.10 for each vote secured.
(f) It shall be compulsory for all registered political
parties to get a statement of income and expenditure audited annually.
The statement shall be a public document.
The local post-office shall be in charge of maintaining
and revising electoral rolls on a regular basis. At present most citizens
have no access to electoral rolls, and the procedure for additions, deletions
and corrections are ineffective in reality, though the law is eminently
sensible. There is evidence to suggest that in urban areas the electoral
rolls are flawed upto 40 percent.
(b) It should be mandatory for the Election Commission
to provide voter Identity Cards to every citizen who figures on the electoral
rolls. Once this process is completed, the voter identity card or other
means of identification should be made compulsory for voting.
(c) If the proportion of "tendered" votes in a polling
booth is greater than one percent of the total electorate, a repoll shall
be ordered in the booth. A tendered ballot is given to a voter in whose
name a false vote was already cast, and who establishes identity. Therefore,
a tendered vote is indisputable proof of personation and rigging. At present
a tendered ballot is kept in a separate cover and is not counted, while
the false vote cast is counted! If this repoll provision is incorporated
and publicised, people will then avail the facility of tendered vote, and
rigging will be self-limiting for fear of a repoll.
Notwithstanding anything contained in this act, every
recognised political party shall nominate women candidates on behalf of
that party, as nearly as may be, in at least one-third of the constituencies
in which the party is contesting, in every general election.
Provided that for an election to Lok Sabha, the State
shall be the unit for such nomination, and for an election to Legislative
Assembly, a cluster of three parliamentary constituencies shall be the
unit as nearly as may be.
Provided that for Lok Sabha election, in case of States
with less than 3 seats, a cluster of States to be defined by the Election
Commission shall be treated as a unit.
(For removal of any doubt, these provisions will apply
in all States and union territories for recognised national parties, and
in the respective State or States for recognised State parties)
Provided that in respect of seats reserved for scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes, the State shall be the unit for nomination
of women for all general elections; and one-third of all candidates nominated
for the reserved constituencies shall be women.
Provided that in case of by-elections, the party shall
nominate as nearly as may be one-third women candidates for the Lok Sabha
and Legislative Assembly, with the nation as unit for Lok Sabha and State
as unit for Legislative Assembly. Provided further that, in respect of
State parties, this provision will apply for State as unit for Lok Sabha.
In the event of a recognised political party not complying
with these provisions, for the shortfall of every woman candidate while
nominating candidates for elective office, two male candidates of the party
in the State or cluster of parliament constituencies, as the case maybe,
as decided by the party shall be deemed to be Independent candidates for
all purposes including allotment of symbols.
The Election Commission or the officials authorised by
it at the State or Union Territory level shall determine the compliance
or otherwise of these provisions after the completion of withdrawal of
nominations.
Provided that the candidates so disqualified shall be
from reserved vacancies in case the shortfall is in reserved vacancies.
Part B - Constitution Amendment
Bill
In the Council of States, as nearly as maybe one-third
of all seats, whether elected or nominated, shall be reserved for women.
In the States in which Legislative Councils exist, as
nearly as maybe, one-third of all seats filled from each category, whether
elected or nominated, shall be reserved for women;
Provided that in case of members elected by members of
local authorities, graduates, and teachers, the seats reserved for women
shall be rotated, and decided by draw of lots.
Ever since the existing Women's Reservation Bill was first
made known to the public, some of us have been pointing to its serious
flaws and appealing that it be improved, if women are to actually benefit
from reservations (See manushi Nos. 96, 97 and 107). Unfortunately, even
well meaning suggestions for improvement have not been heeded before the
Bill got tabled in parliament during the winter session in 1999. Therefore,
we have taken the initiative to draft an Alternative Women's Reservation
Bill which we believe is more workable. If you are in favour of this proposal,
please endorse it in the Support Sheet
and also get the endorsement of others who are likely to support this measure.
This will help us get it tabled and debated in parliament so that the best
possible legislation is adopted.
An Alternative to the Government Bill for Women's Reservation
Forum for Democratic Reforms - Dr. Jayaprakash Narayan (Lok Satta,Hyderabad),
Dhirubhai Sheth (Lokayan, Delhi),
Yogendra Yadav (CSDS, Delhi),
Madhu Kishwar (Manushi, New Delhi)
Manushi, Issue 116:
The ugly scenes and stalemate over tabling the Women's
Reservation Bill in parliament have had a very beneficial effect. They
have finally brought the grim truth into sharper focus that politics has
proven to be very inhospitable for women in independent India. What we
are witnessing today is a worrisome phenomenon of further decline in the
participation of women, not only in our legislatures, but in many other
of our political and public spaces.
conduct or corruption, at the time of filing nominations.
This declaration should be made public. False declaration should be a ground
for disqualification.
A Bill To Amend The Representation of People's Act
– 1951
(New Section 34)
(Amending Articles 80 and 171)
We Need Your Endorsement and Support
