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Why fear the people's choice?
Calling Pakistan's bluff on a Kashmir plebiscite
Manushi, issue 131 :
The recent election in Kashmir has been fought under the shadow of the
gun. Pro-Pakistani terrorist outfits openly issued and, at times, even
carried out their threats of extermination against those who voted or
stood for elections. Nevertheless,a significantly large section of people
enthusiastically took part in this election at great risk to their lives.
In the rest of the country, politicians often find it difficult to get an
audience to attend their election meetings. By contrast, newspaper and
television coverage as well as the statewide survey carried out by the
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies showed that in the insurgency
ridden Kashmir Valley, election meetings were very well attended, despite
the fact that several candidates lost their lives to terrorist violence.
Murderous attacks were made on several election meetings with popular
candidates like Mehbooba Sayeed made special targets of violence.
Interestingly this is the first time a woman politician, Mehbooba the
daughter of ex-Congressman Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, has emerged as a
significant player in the politics of the Kashmir Valley and that too on
her own strength. It is openly acknowledged that her party, People's
Democratic Front, won 16 seats in the Valley largely due to her
contribution. Throughout the dark days of insurgency and state repression,
she was one of the few mainstream politicians who openly stood up to
protest against human rights abuses, while at the same time advocating a
peaceful resolution of the conflict, thus risking the ire of terrorists.
She also actively intervened on behalf of victimised families, offering
them help and solace. It is to be seen whether she and her party will use
this mandate to work for the restoration of democracy and peace in the
State by involving the secessionist groups in a meaningful dialogue and
providing good governance in the State.
People Value Free Vote
An important reason for a change in mood among the people of J&K, from
cynicism about the worth of Indian democracy to hopeful assertion of their
democratic rights, was the visibly non-partisan conduct of the Election
Commission, especially the Chief Election Commissioner, Mr James Lyngdoh.
His firmness in declaring that early elections should not be pushed on the
terrorised Muslims of Gujarat gave the estranged Kashmiris hope that he
might well be as sincere about safeguarding the integrity of the electoral
process in J&K. His subsequent visit to Kashmir and the firmness with
which he asked the Army to stay out of elections played a major role in
restoring people's faith in the autonomy and integrity of the Election
Commission. Moral of the story? Democracy becomes meaningful only if
people can trust key institutions of the State to safeguard their
citizenship rights.
India's rulers tend to forget that the people in this country are willing
to fight do or die battles for protecting the sanctity of their vote and
their right to exercise it without fear or coercion. The right to bring
down a government that does not deliver and inflict defeat on a party that
is not responsive to people's needs and aspirations gives people a sense
of power and enhances their participation and stakes in the system of
governance. This is what lends vibrancy to a democracy. The fact that
through the simple act of voting people could humble both the BJP, the
leader of the ruling coalition at the centre as well as Abdullah's
National Conference, the ruling party in the State has restored a sense of
power and the much-needed boost to the political morale of the Kashmiri
people. The 1977 election is likewise remembered in the Valley with
respect as a notable landmark precisely because Morarji Desai, the then
Prime Minster, had made known to the administrative machinery, as well as
to his own party members, that he would not tolerate a rigged election.
However, if the major political breakthrough achieved by the 2002 election
is not followed up by honest and determined measures to put democracy on a
firm footing in the state of J&K, the Indian Government would be guilty of
jeopardising the future of democracy in all of India, not just in Kashmir.
The relative success of this election should not make the Indian
Government complacent and feel that it has scored a point over Pakistan.
No matter how well India handles the post election scenario, Pakistan is
unlikely to accept any peaceful resolution of the situation, especially if
it goes in India's favour. The ruling elite of Pakistan is most threatened
by prospect of democracy being restored in Kashmir through a series of
genuinely free and fair elections, as well as other necessary measures the
Indian Government might take to heal the wounds caused by human rights
abuses. The Pakistani regime is not likely to change its policy of
bleeding India through various overt and covert means and disrupting
Kashmir politics through terror brigades until the people of J&K are able
to decisively and persistently demonstrate to the entire world that their
political aspirations are significantly different from those that the
Pakistani rulers wish to impose on them.
The Promised Plebiscite
A Pakistani claim to Kashmir rests on the assumption that, as a Muslim
majority state, J&K should necessarily have become part of Pakistan. They
call it the unfinished agenda of the Partition because they have a 'do-or-
die' stake in destroying India's pluralist democracy and to establish that
the Hindus and the Muslims cannot coexist peacefully.
Pakistan continually reiterates that India has gone back on the commitment
Nehru made before the United Nations that the future of J&K would be
decided through a plebiscite. Thus, on the surface, Pakistan uses the
rhetoric of democracy and "people's right to self determination" as a
stick to beat up India with, even though Pakistan itself has never been
serious about holding the plebiscite on the terms and conditions agreed
upon then. The plebiscite was to be held in both the Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (POK) as well as in the areas that voluntarily opted to be with
the Indian Union, pending a plebiscite. Interestingly, Pakistan
studiously avoids talking of plebiscite in POK. And has done its best to
confine the issue of plebiscite only to the Kashmir Valley where the
Muslims are a preponderant numerical majority. There is hardly ever a
mention of plebiscite by Pakistani politicians in the Jammu or Ladakh
regions of J&K - where the Hindus and Buddhists constitute numerical
majorities in the respective regions. The Muslims are positioned as a
numerically significant minority in both these regions.
An essential pre-condition set by the UN resolution for holding a
plebiscite was that Pakistan would withdraw its army and armed civilian
invaders from parts of Kashmir it had illegally occupied. That is the last
thing the Pakistani military establishment ever wanted to do. Therefore,
there was no occasion for India to take the required follow up steps as
preparation for plebiscite.
Pakistani Occupied Kashmir has not experienced even the limited and flawed
democracy that prevailed in Indian Kashmir. The military in Pakistan has
never allowed any civilian regime in POK, or for that matter in any part
of Pakistan, to have any meaningful role in governance even for those
brief periods when civilian governments have been voted to power.
Therefore, total withdrawal of the Army from POK has always been seen as a
high-risk initiative, by the military establishment of Pakistan, which it
was never willing to take.
Most important of all, the Pakistani military and intelligence
establishment has acquired a deep and long term vested interest in keeping
the Kashmir issue on a permanent boil. The jehadi rhetoric that goes with
it allows them to keep their own people in a permanent state of frenzy,
overshadowing all important issues related to internal politics and
accountability of governance, thus allowing a much larger and excessively
prominent role for the Pakistani Army in the political, administrative,
cultural and even religious life of the country. In addition, the Generals
can make a lot of money for themselves through kickbacks in defence deals
that grow bigger and bigger with the escalating arms race in the
sub-continent.
Limiting Role of the Army
However, India could well afford to take the risk of limiting the role of
its armed forces in the Valley to protection of the borders and dealing
with terrorist infiltration from Pakistan. If that source of support and
mischief is brought under control, the civilian protest can easily be
dealt with through democratic means.
The Indian Army had received wholehearted support of the Kashmiri people
in driving out the Pakistani raiders in 1947. It became unpopular only
after it was made to play an active role in dealing with the civilian
protest during phases of Central rule after dismissal of duly elected
governments in the State. Today, the excessive use of the Army is the
biggest irritant and hindrance to the return of peace in the Valley. For
example, the much higher election turnout this time was in large part due
to the fact that the Election Commission asked the Army to refrain from
forcing people to vote. Such coercion by the Army in the previous
elections had contributed to the very low turnout among the Kashmiri
Muslims. This time the Army was asked to confine their presence to
combating terrorist threats rather than involve themselves in electoral
and political affairs. This worked in India's favour, rather than against
it.
This is not to deny that even Nehru lost the nerve to honour his
commitment to holding a plebiscite. It was not because his faith in
democracy faltered but because he felt he would be jeopardising the fate
of the Muslim minority in the rest of India if the Partition scarred
Hindus felt that a Muslim majority province was being given yet another
chance to effect yet another Partition and drive out the Hindus and
Buddhists from the state of J&K as well, especially since their cultural,
emotional and religious ties of Hindus with Kashmir are very deep.
Another secession by a section of the Muslims would have emboldened the
hitherto margin-alised organisations like the RSS and Hindu Maha Sabha to
demand that the Partition be carried to its logical conclusion by driving
all the Muslims out of India much in the same way that the Pakistanis
carried out a near total ethnic cleansing of Hindus and Sikhs in the newly
created Islamic Republic. Thus both India and Pakistan, for their own
different reasons let the issue of plebiscite be buried for nearly three
decades till a series of rigged elections in the State led to massive
resentment in the Valley, with Pakistan getting the needed opportunity to
fish in troubled waters.
Voting with Their Feet
Nevertheless, even at the height of estrangement of Kashmiri Muslims from
the Indian government, pro-Pakistani sentiment has remained confined to a
minority even in the Valley, while it is negligible among the Muslims of
the Jammu and Ladakh regions. Even those among Kashmiri Muslims who are
determinedly "anti-India"demand'azadi'or independence for not only the
whole of J & K but also Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).
It is noteworthy that even when the Kashmiri Muslims boycotted elections,
alleging fraud and manipulation, the economically mobile segments of the
people showed which side they align themselves with for their own economic
self-interest. Those who needed guns went over to Pakistan. However, all
those Kashmiri Muslims engaged in business shifted their base from Kashmir
to cities in the heartland of India such as Delhi and Bombay. Thus they
could be said to have voted with their feet. Their choice clearly
demonstrated that they saw at least their economic interest better
protected in the heartland of India than in Pakistan.
New Dimension to Plebiscite
The most important dimension of the current political scenario, however,
is that when the average Kashmiri Muslim demands that the Kashmiri people
be given the promised right to self determination, he or she sees it
primarily as a way to win 'azadi' for Kashmir, rather than be forced to
opt for either Pakistan or India. However, the terms set for a plebiscite
in 1948, do not make this third choice available. As per that covenant,
people can only opt for either India or Pakistan. Since that time the
people of the State have become far more important as political players
and stakeholders. At that time, if the Maharaja of J&K had opted for
Pakistan or India, they were likely to have passively gone along with him,
as did people of other states.
When Sheikh Abdullah made the tilt in favour of India, Kashmiri Muslims
went along with him. Today, there is no such leader or even a group of
leaders who can swing opinion one way or another on the strength of their
hold over people. The citizens insist on their sovereignty and want the
right to decide Kashmir's future. They have over the years opened up many
new options. For example, the Simla Accord between Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto
committed the two sides to treat Kashmir as a bilateral problem and move
towards accepting the present Line of Control (LOC) as the international
border. This was at that time widely welcomed by the people of Kashmir.
The National Conference, which even in its battered condition won 28 seats
and still has the status of the single largest party in J&K, has publicly
committed itself to this position.
Similarly, there has been a consistent demand from a section of the
Kashmiris for the last decade and a half that the border between POK and
J&K be made porous to allow for a natural process of social integration of
the two Kashmirs, uniting divided families, de-escalating tension as
necessary steps towards preparing for a plebiscite. All these new options
being put on the agenda by the Kashmiri people themselves can not be
dismissed in favour of the old plebiscite formula, which becomes
irrelevant because it was put in deep freeze and allowed to ossify,
whereas the political situation at the ground level became more and more
dynamic and open ended.
Those who insist on a plebiscite as the definite way of determining
people's will, forget that there is more than one democratic method, and
some more democratic than a plebiscite, of ascertaining people's will.
Election is one of them. The very fact that the people of Kashmir have
enthusiastically participated in at least four elections after 1947 and
disowned or boycotted only a few, shows that they did take elections as an
instrument of self assertion seriously. As Elie Kedourie in his
discussion of plebiscites points out:
There is really nothing conclusive about plebiscites except that a certain
population subject to conflicting propaganda or pressures or inducements
voted on a given day in one manner and not in another. The result, if
accepted once and for all, has the same element of arbitrariness as any
other, which may come about by reason of conquest or bargaining.
(Nationalism, Blackwell, 1993 p 126)
Kedourie also argues that: If plebiscites are justified by the same reason
as elections, why should plebiscites not be held regularly like elections,
and why should a population not be able to change its allegiance
periodically, as it is able to change its government? (Ibid p.126)
To illustrate the point: if a plebiscite were held now not just in Indian
held Kashmir but in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK), as well as in other
parts of India and Pakistan, the results might be very different from the
political boundaries that emerged from the Partition of 1947.
We have yet to develop political systems, which provide for effective
mechanisms for broad based participation of the people in decision-making
without the use of an unidimensional majority vote as the single decisive
criterion in decision-making on particular issues. But at the same time we
must recognise the limitations of the use of the principle of majority
rule when its leaders disregard minority rights that must be clearly
stated and carefully observed if we seek to create acceptable, just and
stable polities. Too often political leaders identify their self-defined
majority not as a temporary group that has decided to vote together on a
particular issue, but rather as an unfettered and unchallengeable
permanent rule maker for all.
In unstable societies with deep divisions and little agreement about basic
principles there must be implicit or explicit agreement on what issues may
be amenable to being decided by majority vote and what issues require
limitations on the will of the majority and its representatives over
certain basic human rights of the minorities. These need to be sorted out
on some other basis than majority rule. For instance, voting on how much
the society should be spending on health, education, or transportation
should under ordinary circumstances be handled through the rule of the
majority by voting. However, we should not entertain the possibility of
any kind assuming the right to exterminate the minority groups , or to
confine them to prisons or reserved areas, or to disenfranchise them,
through the instrument of majority vote.
Differing Claims & Agendas
Even at the height of the secessionist movement, it is highly unlikely
that any plebiscite would have gone in favour of Pakistan because there is
an overwhelming sentiment in favour of 'azadi'. Senior journalists and
politicians from Pakistan themselves admit this in private. I have
personally heard important public figures from Pakistan say in private
conversations that 'if India actually agreed to hold a plebiscite,
Pakistani rulers would be caught with their pants down and would not even
know where to look for cover'.
Broadly speaking, even if we do not take account of the opinion and
desires of the diverse communities that inhabit the state of J&K and take
into account only the inclinations of Kashmiri Muslims, there are
currently three main streams of opinion among the Muslims of the Valley:
-
A small fringe led by the likes of Geelani and leaders of the Hizbul
Mujaheddin who would like to secede to Pakistan. They command very little
mass support in the state, which is an important reason why they stay
hooked on to Pakistan sponsored terrorist brigades to achieve their
political ends.
-
A very large section among Kashmiri Muslims wants 'azadi' or independence
from both India and Pakistan and reunification of the two divided parts of
Kashmir. The leadership of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
has been facing murderous attacks and attempts at extermination from
Pakistan government's terror brigades ever since they made it clear that
their movement was not in favour of Kashmir becoming a part of Pakistan.
-
The third section of opinion is in favour of greater regional autonomy
within the Indian Union. Many of the followers of the National Conference,
the Congress Party, and a host of other national parties, like the Janata
Dal and the Communist parties are in varying degrees supporters of greater
devolution of powers and rejuvenation of democratic institutions in the
State.
It is noteworthy that the percentage of those who opt for any one of these
three choices is very fluid. Some of those who were strongly "pro-India"
through the 1950s and 1960s turned "anti-India" during the 1980s and
1990s. Many of the secessionist leaders of today have fought and some even
won elections to the J&K Assembly. Similarly, many who looked to Pakistan
as a saviour during the 1990s have been disillusioned and turned back to
Indian democracy. While an overwhelming majority might vote for
independence for Kashmir today because they are deeply estranged by
repeated assaults on their citizenship rights, they might well opt for
greater autonomy within the Indian Union five years from now, if the
ruling establishment of India behaves sensitively towards their hurt and
acts responsibly towards their political aspirations. This is a very
likely scenario; especially considering that pro 'azadi' leaders of
Kashmir have never taken the trouble to spell out the exact contours and
content of 'azadi'.
Slogan without Content?
'Azadi' is no doubt a very powerful and emotive slogan but it has remained
precisely that: a mere slogan. Whenever I have personally tried to engage
some of the Hurriyat leaders to spell out their political vision in a
concrete way or asked them to explain what is it that they would do
differently if they actually got 'azadi', I have been met either with
silence or with evasive replies like: "We will figure that out once we get
azadi."
This is very similar to how Jinnah kept building a frenzied movement in
favour of Pakistan, without spelling out even in vague a outline what it
would actually entail. This is borne out even by the sympathetic and
insightful political biography of Jinnah by Pakistani historian Ayesha
Jalal. Gandhi, Nehru, Maulana Azad, Patel and a host of nationalist
leaders lost out to Jinnah because they never once asked Jinnah to
seriously explain what his Islamic haven would be like -what principle
would be used to divide the geographical territories, who would qualify as
a citizen and who would be denied the right to live there. Had Muslims of
the sub-continent been told in advance that millions of them would be
uprooted from their land of birth to realise that dream and that all
Muslims would not find a place in that Land of Promise - in fact many more
would have to continue living in India than would find a place in Pakistan
- and with millions of Muslim families divided between these two hostile
nation states - it is unlikely that as many Muslims would have endorsed
Jinnah's slogan of Pakistan as came to do so during the frenzied 1940s.
Our political leaders of today are repeating the same mistake of not
asking for a similar clarification from the separatist leaders on a
variety of issues. For example, under the 'azadi' dispensation, what will
be the fate of the Kashmiri Pandits who have been forced out of the valley
with many still living in the refugee camps of Jammu because life became
too dangerous for them in Kashmir. What about the nearly 70 per cent Hindu
and Sikh majority of Jammu region who will not hear of secession from
India or for that matter the Muslims among the Gujjars, Punjabis and
diverse other ethnic communities of the Jammu region who do not share the
aspirations of their co religionists in the Valley? What about the right
to self determination of the 52 percent Buddhists of Ladakh who would like
their part of J&K to be made into a Union territory because they resent
the domination of Kashmiri Muslims over the politics of the State? Many
Ladakhi Muslims too would rather go along with their Buddhist counterparts
rather than make common cause with Kashmiri Muslims.
The Kashmiri Muslim leadership has so far shown no sensitivity towards the
rights and aspirations of all these diverse groups. If theirs is indeed a
movement of regional independence, why then are non-Kashmiri Muslims and
non Muslim Kashmiris who together constitute more than nearly 35 per cent
of the population of J&K not being included in their vision of an
independent Kashmir? The people of both these regions feel as aggrieved
against the domination of Srinagar in the State's polity as does Srinagar
against New Delhi.
Concensual Secession is O. K!
If any region of India is to secede to Pakistan or become independent, the
leaders of such a secessionist movement must demonstrate their ability to
carry along a vast majority of opinion among all religious and ethnic
communities inhabiting that region to endorse that option by political
persuasion rather than by gun. The civilised world cannot allow repetition
of the murderous solution of the 1947 variety to solve the Kashmir problem
whereby millions of people were violently uprooted from their homes,
villages and towns simply because in that region they constituted a
religious minority. The Partition of the sub continent in 1947 proved to
be a political disaster, not just because it divided people on the basis
of religion, but because it also forced through terror and violence
millions of panic stricken people to abandon their homes and hearths,
neighbourhoods and all they owned. Pakistan came into existence via mass
murder and ethnic cleansing. Muslim majority areas came to be declared as
belonging to the State of Pakistan and Hindu majority areas brought under
the charge of the Indian Union with divided families on both sides of the
border - one set of relatives labelled as Pakistanis and another set as
Indians - depending on whether they lived in a Muslim majority or a Hindu
majority area.
If we accept the logic that, within the territory of each arbitrarily
carved out nation-state, every ethnic majority of its region is entitled
to unlimited rights to subjugate, eliminate or push out a minority, we
will be pushed to the inexorable logic of a nation-state where tragedy
after tragedy of ethnic cleansing, murderous riots, and political chaos
overtake its democratic and secular features.
Minorities and Majorities
Every Indian community is a minority in some places and a majority
elsewhere. For example, Hindus are a minority in Jammu and Kashmir,
Punjab, Mizoram and Nagaland but a majority everywhere else. Muslims are a
minority everywhere but in Kashmir. The Sikhs are a minority everywhere
but in Punjab. The Christians are a tiny minority everywhere but in
Nagaland, where they are a majority. The list doesn't stop there. Yadavs
as a caste may be a majority in certain rural pockets of Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar, but an overall minority in the State. Jat Sikhs may be a majority
in Punjab villages but are a minority in most Punjab cities. If Mazhabi
Sikhs and other non-Jat Sikhs of Punjab were added to the non-Jat figures,
Jat Sikhs would be a minority even within Punjab. Kannadigas living in
Tamil Nadu, Gujaratis in Maharashtra, and Marwaris in Calcutta are
minorities outside their own states. Not too long ago Shiv Sena, the party
that today wants Muslims driven out of India, focused its energies on the
demand to push Tamils out of Maharashtra.
The logic of majoritarianism, of identifying a minority group by certain
supposedly objective characteristics that are in practice viewed as mostly
religious, cultural, or biological, and then destroying or driving them
out because they are a minority, can easily proceed in its deadly logic
from group to group. Once such a process is unleashed, a descent into
panic, fear, hatred, desire for revenge and sheer murderous madness
follows inevitably.
Need New Plebiscite Deal
Just as a plebiscite that only offers two choices to the people of
J&K-join India or join Pakistan-is altogether meaningless in a context
where an overwhelming majority of those seeking self determination want
the third option of 'azadi', so also a plebiscite which ignores the
security concerns and political aspirations of a very substantial
proportion of people of the State simply because they are at a numerical
disadvantage, is a mockery of the very concept of self determination.
Therefore, today's situation demands re-framing the terms of a plebiscite
or referendum to make it meet the essential requirements of democracy by
giving the minorities an important voice in the decision because it
affects each person's very survival.
Despite the principled reservations regarding the jurisdiction and value
of plebiscites, I would still argue that the only way for India to get out
of the current stalemate on this issue is to grab the bull by the horns
and stop fighting a defensive battle vis a vis Pakistan. Instead of being
blackmailed and terrorised at being reminded of this reneged commitment,
India should be actively working toward a carefully redefined plebiscite
on the following lines.
To begin with, the New Plebiscite Deal should require the winning of at
least a two third majority rather than a simple majority vote, as is
required in ordinary elections, since a plebiscite involves a permanent
and momentous decision with serious consequences for every single person
living in that State. The decision of a plebiscite is irreversible whereas
in elections the voters can change their choice and verdict with every
round of elections. Whether the Chief Minister of J&K is from the National
Conference or the Congress Party does not have the same kind of bearing on
people's lives, as the decision about whether J&K becomes part of India or
Pakistan. For example, many of those who voted for the National Conference
in 1951 turned against it in subsequent elections. Likewise, many of those
who boycotted the 1996 elections, at the call of secessionist leaders,
snubbed the very same leaders in the recent 2002 elections by turning out
to vote despite great risk to their lives. Thus, elections that involve
less fundamental issues allow people to respond to new options, choices
and issues thrown up by a polity at different points of time. In some
elections, the majority vote in the Jammu region went to the BJP - while
at other times the Congress managed to win a majority vote in its favour.
The victory of the BJP or Congress involves relatively small shifts in the
State's politics because both the parties have to operate under the
framework laid down by the Indian Constitution and Indian jurisprudence.
However, a vote in favour of Pakistan or 'azadi' for J&K drawn through a
plebiscite means even those citizens who did not opt for either of those
two choices have to end up living under a radically different dispensation
- to be ruled the way that Pakistan is ruled. Therefore, a plebiscite must
operate within a democratic framework that maintains strong and
significant safeguards against the tyranny of the majority on the
minority. It should, as far as possible, be carried out when tempers are
not running high and when people are in a position to carefully weigh the
pros and cons of their decision. The hallmark of democracy is how well it
safeguards the rights of its minorities. Therefore, important safeguards
must be built in and enforced before any plebiscite is held in J & K
keeping in view all the varied choices and options which different
sections of Kashmiri opinion have articulated in varied ways--ranging from
democratic politics to support for a certain kind of militancy and
rejection of the imported variety.
Three Phase Referendum
In order to settle the issue once and for all, we should demand that both
India and Pakistan prepare for a genuine three-phase referendum. However,
a first necessary step would be to initiate serious discussion, public
debate, and participative consultations regarding what range of choices
should become available to the people through a referendum. The exercise
should be concluded within a specified time frame, of say two years.
The unit for plebiscite would have to consist of the entire state of J&K
(including Jammu and Ladakh) that is presently with the Indian Union as
well all the Pakistan occupied areas of J&K.
It is likely that atleast the following four options would emerge out of
the two year process of public hearings and dialogue:
-
'Azadi' or Independence from both Pakistan and India for the entire and unified state of J & K.
-
Secession of Indian Kashmir to Pakistan.
-
Secession of POK to India with that region joining the existing territory of J&K as part of the Indian Union.
-
Accepting the existing Line of Control (LOC)as the permanent international border between India and Pakistan.
It is a disgrace that democratic India has let the world gain the
impression that it is afraid of people's verdict and allowed military
ruled Pakistan to emerge as the champion of Kashmiri right to
self-determination. We must take the bull by the horns and get the UN to
push Pakistan into biting the bullet and that too under the vigilant eye
of the UN monitors. A likely scenario is that even if a referendum were to
be held tomorrow around these four choices, about 90 per cent of Kashmiri
Muslims would opt for 'azadi' and roughly five per cent each for India and
Pakistan as their first choice. However, if a referendum is held in the
Valley about a decade from now, after two or three successful free and
fair elections and meaningful devolution of power to the State, the
proportion of those opting in favour of India would shoot up and those in
favour of a total break from India will go down, while Pakistan is not
likely to improve its tally. Thus, Pakistan is likely to lose its claim to
Kashmir in the first round itself. However, if the Indian government fails
to deliver genuine autonomy and continues with its ham handed ways, it
could lose whatever little moral and political legitimacy it has today for
resisting secession.
In the second phase, the international community should commit itself to
the following offer to the Kashmiri leaders who stand for an independent
Kashmir:
'We will facilitate J&K's secession from India under the following
conditions:that the decision for secession be endorsed by a two third vote
of the Muslim population of the State and at least 51 per cent vote among
the Hindus and Buddhist of J&K. The rest of those who are not yet won over
to the cause of secession will need to be given concrete assurance through
the United Nations that their rights as a dissenting minority will be
firmly protected and an effective formula for power sharing with
minorities will be evolved under the new dispensation of 'Azad Kashmir'.
However, the UN would retain the right to intervene in case the guarantees
given to minority communities are not honoured. Thus, an independent
Kashmir , if it ever came into existence would have to agree to limited
and conditional sovereignty vis a vis the UN with regard to the rights of
minorities and institutionalising democracy. This would include a
provision that if the UN monitors find that the promises made at the time
of 'azadi' have not been respected the UN would have the right to enforce
a new democratic mandate in the State'.
The Kashmiri Muslims are not likely to have problems with the enhanced
role of the UN because they have been vociferously demanding the active
involvement of the UN in the affairs of Kashmir. We will only be giving
them a generous dose of their self-prescribed remedy.
Other necessary steps involved in the Plebiscite would be as follows:
?Withdrawal of armies from both sides of Kashmir for five years at the end
of which a plebiscite would be held under UN auspices. ?Both sides to
allow free access of people across the Line of Control during the
plebiscite campaigning, including the right to campaign and propagate
their view point through television, cinema and other media, provided no
hate speech or violence is used in the process. The mechanics for
differentiating the ballots of the three religious communities would be as
follows: Three colour ballot papers - say white for the Muslims, blue for
the Buddhists and green for the Hindus.
Minus all the above mentioned safeguards, it is likely that a Muslim
dominated independent Kashmir might simply exterminate or drive out the
non-Muslim population of the J&K State as happened in Pakistan where the
few thousand surviving Hindus, Sikhs and Christians live under terror
facing brutal forms of discrimination in every walk of life. Therefore,
pre-emptive measures are needed right at the start of the plebiscite
process to place firm limits on what the winners of the plebiscite can do
and not do in the area of human, democratic, and citizenship rights so
that the wellbeing of minorities is not endangered if the plebiscite
result goes against their wishes.
The international community is not likely to object to these safeguards
for minorities since the key litmus test of a democracy is what
institutional mechanisms exist for the protection of the interests of
minorities. These safeguards become all the more essential considering
that none of the Muslim majority nation states of our times have shown
adequate regard for the rights of non-Muslim minorities. Today many other
countries , including some in Europe, are facing similar challenges. The
deal proposed for Kashmir would set a healthy new precedent for working
out democratic solutions for minority-- majority relations and an
effective formula for power sharing which might well become a model for
many other countries where ethnic minorities find themselves trapped in
similar vulnerabilities.
Madhu Kishwar
November 2002
Acknowledgement : I am indebted to my colleagues Dhirubhai Sheth
and Berny Horowitz for their very useful feedback on an earlier version of
this draft and for sharing the responsibility for whatever shortcomings
are still left in this revised version.
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