FLOOD CONTROL
	In Maharashtra, the government loves calamities
	
		A audit of the Maharashtra government's post-flood disaster relief
		expenditure of the last two years has thrown up plenty of instances
		of misuse of funds. The audit has also gone into the causes of floods 
		turning out to be disasters. 
		
		Himanshu Upadhyaya
		 has more.
		
  10 July 2007 -
   The Comptroller and Auditors General's (CAG) audit report for Maharashtra tabled on 
the floor of the state legislature on 18 April has scrutinised the post-flood 
disaster relief expenditure in the year 2005 and 2006. Performance audit of the 
expenditure on preparedness for flood and relief and rehabilitation to the flood 
victims indicated that the level of preparedness of flood was not adequate; 
relief assistance was extended without proper identification of affected 
persons, financial management was deficient and monitoring of relief and 
rehabilitation activities was unsatisfactory.
		
		But this audit has also gone a step beyond just reporting the financial 
irregularities, by training a lens on the causes of floods turning out to be 
disasters. It shows how multi purpose projects  where one purpose is flood 
control  will fail to insure people against flood disasters unless our 
planners integrate thinking on drainage and upstream-downstream linkages.
		
	
		
		
		
			No lessons were learnt from flood disaster of 2005, and the VHF system in Nanded and Sangli district  and 
three talukas of Kolhapur district - was found non functional during the subsequent flood disaster of 2006.
			
In urban residential areas, rain water doesn't run off easily s it does creating rivulets in the countryside. 
Stormwater drains provide the way out to water that would otherwise clog the tarred
streets and concreted floors. 
Pre-monsoon drainage cleaning exercises 
need to be carried out to ensure that stormwater drains would discharge 
drainwater upto their designed capacity.
		
		
		 
		
			
			
			  
			Willful breaking of Narmada promises
	
	
			
			
			  
			Drains that dewater exchequer
	
	
		
 
		
		
		Although the model action plan prepared by Union Government in 1981 had laid 
down the importance of cleaning of drainage passing through residential areas 
regularly well before the onset of monsoon, the CAG's audit scrutiny found that in 
none of the ten Maharashtra districts - where audit review was carried out - instructions for 
drainage cleaning were issued from the administrative departments to the 
district authorities and local bodies. 
		
		Even after the flood disaster of July-August 2005, long-term 
plans aimed at desiltation of rivers, improvement of drainage system were not 
done in any districts except Mumbai. In the case of Mumbai, on recommendations 
of the government's fact-finding Madhavrao Chitale committee, desiltation and 
widening of Mumbai's Mithi river was carried out. But even here, CAG could 
not ascertain the claim by the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority, 
of having excavated 
12.96 lakh cubic metres of silt/debris/rock from the river. 
There were no records available on measurement of stack at 
dumping sites or on the
transportation of silt.
		
		Furthermore, the state level Disaster Management Plan had assigned the 
responsibility jointly to district authorities and Reservoir Engineers of Water 
Resources Dept for keeping a vigil on the water levels in reservoirs and 
monitoring outflows (downstream releases) effectively with enough warning to the 
people downstream. But the audit found out that the water levels in all dams 
 including 
Karnataka's Almatti dam  were not monitored during the 2005 monsoon.
		
		In 2000, the Supreme Court allowed the full reservoir level (FRL) 
of the Almatti Dam to go upto 519.60 metres while expecting the issue of 
submergence due to be adjudicated by a competent tribunal. 
Clearance for raising storage level was accordingly given by the Central 
Water Commission and Planning Commission subject to the condition that 
the Government of Karnataka regulate the water storage level by discharging 
sufficient water, that 
there would not be any submergence in the territory
of Maharashtra.
		
		But in monsoon-2005, the Karnataka government did not care to pre-deplete the 
reservoir for avoiding submergence in Maharashtra till 31 July 2005. Water 
storage due to heavy rainfall had reached the FRL of 519.60 metres on 
26 July 2005 itself. Yet, Maharashtra authorities wrote the first letter to their 
Karnataka counterparts for releasing water from Almatti Dam only on 3 August 2005, after 
Sangli got flooded fully.
		
		From 31 July 2005, Karnataka had started releasing water and the reservoir
		level went down to 517.20 metres on 4 August 2005. During this time, Sangli 
		remained 
under prolonged submergence for seven to eight days, mainly due
		to the backwater effect of the Almatti dam. This had affected many families 
		to whom the Maharashtra government had granted relief assistance of 
		Rs.
58.78 crores. This could have been avoided, had the conditions of clearance
		for the Almatti dam been followed by keeping close vigil on water levels. 
		(Additional submergence in the upstream areas over and above the reservoir 
		area at FRL is called the backwater effect.)
	
		
		
		
		Separate from the CAG audit of Maharashtra, there are also questions on whether backwater 
		submergence effect is estimated and shown along with the displacement from dam projects. 
In the case of Narmada Sagar Dam, the backwater effect and resultant submergence was only estimated 
after the Jabalpur High Court issued directives for the same. 
Similar concerns have existed in the case of Sardar Sarovar Project. The Narmada Valley 
Development Authority in Madhya Pradesh did not know the submergence due to backwater 
effects, according to a report in the publication Dams, Rivers and People.
		
		 
		
			
			
			  
			Willful breaking of Narmada promises
	
	
			
			
			  
			Drains that dewater exchequer
	
	
		

		
		According to recent reports in 
Afternoon Maharashtra, state legislators led
		by Legislative Council chairman, Shivajirao Deshmukh met on 11 June 
		to discuss action to the prevent Almatti debacle this year, by talking 
		to Karnataka. It remains to be seen whether that will actually happen.
	
		
		Continuing with the audit report, the improprieties in Maharashtra are 
		endless. Very High 
Frequency sets (VHF sets) for use in warning systems were not in 
place in Mumbai, Parbhani and Raigad districts and were found out of order in 
places where they were available during the flood of 2005. It was observed that 
53 out of 69 VHF sets installed in four districts 1998-'99, were not functioning 
since 2003-'04 for want of maintenance and repairs. No lessons were learnt from 
flood disaster of 2005, and the VHF system in Nanded and Sangli district  and 
three talukas of Kolhapr district - was found non functional during the 
subsequent flood disaster of 2006.
		
		While scrutinising the relief expenditure, the CAG examined cases involving Rs.
500 crore - out of total Rs.780 crores spent on relief in the year 2005  and 
found that nearly 43 percent of the amount was spent without proper documents on 
records. Relief expenditure next year has noticed a better performance with just 
19 percent of amount being wrongfully spent.
		
		The final irony is that the audit also has shown an instance on how everyone 
		seems to love a 
good calamity. In Kadegaon taluka of Sangli district, farmers 
had received Rs.5.80 crores as compensation for crop loss due to heavy rains. 
According to norms decided by the meteorological department, a rain of above 125 
mm in a single day is classified as a heavy rain, whereas Kadegaon town had 
reported only 75 mm rainfall and neighbouring villages only 65 mm.
 
  Himanshu Upadhyaya is an independent researcher working on Public Finance and Accountability issues.