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As late as 1997 a bench mark survey conducted by the TRTI documented figures
of tribals migrating out for 1 month, 2 months, 3 months and 4 months respectively. The
number migrating out for longer periods was not so high as to merit a separate category in
the survey.
Today however, the numbers migrating out for periods as long as 8 months or more has grown
to such proportions that it serves as a fundamental indicator of the extent of the crisis of
adivasi participation in migrant labour markets. With no means of survival other than
marginal land holdings, which provide food for four to six months in a year, more than 80%
of the tribal people are forced to migrate in search of work.
As livelihoods get eroded, old
practices of bonded labour and forced labour are re-emerging in myriad new forms.
Seasonal bondage through consumption loans during the monsoon and the severe exploitation of
casual migrant labour picked up at 'nakas' are just two examples. Surrounded on all sides by
rapidly industrializing and urbanizing areas, the migrant tribal labourers are absorbed in
employment involving hard physical labour under harsh conditions in stone quarries, brick
kilns, sand excavation sites, salt pans, fishing boats, construction sites, as hamals on
trucks, and as casual labour in industries performing the most arduous tasks often involving
health hazards for extremely low wages.
It is this cheap labour that has been subsidizing India's march to modernization, whose
availability is continued through an annual cycle of starvation and bondage. While there is no
recorded survey data on this exponential growth of adivasi migrant labour, there is some
secondary evidence to support this.
Estimates made by organizations working with adivasi populations range from 55% to 70% as
the number of adivasis migrating out of their villages looking for employment. The limited
availability of survey data on the phenomena of exponential growth of adivasi migrant labour
needs to be seen as indicative of the urgent need for such work rather than a basis for
denying the phenomena itself.
In the broadest terms the reasons for the growth of adivasi migrant labour can be broken
down into two categories - (a) historical trends that form the basis for recent growth of
adivasi participation in migrant labour markets and (b) contemporary conditions that are the
basis of the current crisis.
Historical trends
Despite the various protective legislations preventing alienation of tribal lands, a large
percentage of tribals have been reduced to landless labourers or marginal farmers
with miniscule holdings. Land alienation particularly in the case of 'unrecorded tenancies' - in
which tribals had no documentary evidence even in the cases of cultivation of the land by
several successive generations and manipulation of tenancy legislation along with the
failure of land reforms whether it be the land ceiling acts, restoration acts or tenancy
legislation - has led to deteriorating conditions of food security.
This phenomena is also in some part due to subdivision of land as a result of the natural growth of the
family. According to data compiled from the economic survey 2001-2002 in the report on the Employment
Guarantee Scheme by Maithreyi Krishnaraj 'the average size of land holdings have continuously declined from
1970 to 2001'. In the same report it is noted that 27.30% of tribals in Maharashtra have marginal holdings
(less than 1 ha.) and 31.60% have small holdings (1-2 ha). Such extremely small holding make agriculture
unviable so much so that most farmers are not only net buyers of food but also cash staved for other needs.
Development related displacement of adivasis can be categorized under four broad areas:
construction of large dams, development of national and state highway/road networks,
demarcation of national parks and sanctuaries and industrialization under the guise of for
backward areas development. The last decade has witnessed large scale alienation of the
livelihood resources of the poor, especially the tribals to sustain the luxurious lifestyle
peddled by the votaries of globalisation.
Contemporary conditions
Traditional forms of forest based employment have significantly reduced over the last two
decades as a result of the continuous loss of forest, the disbanding of the forest labour
co-operatives and changes in forest policy.
In part this continuous loss of traditional village level employment was offset till
this decade through the availability of limited but sustainable PWD and Forest Department
related infrastructure building work. Much of this work through the PWD and Forest
departments would pay prescribed minimum wages for the designated work, which was
approximately double or more than double the minimum wage rate of agricultural labourers,
paid on Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) works. This allowed for incomes that were in the
realm of sustainable family incomes.
However, the last decade has seen a significant decrease in government spending on public
works projects thus creating conditions where the total funds being disbursed as wages has
itself gone down considerably. Further, public works based employment has been dramatically
altered as the few State projects that do continue, have either been privatized or absorbed
under the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS).
Employment Guarantee Scheme records at the tribal block level often show labour presence to
be in excess of the man-days planned for, which means less work at lower wages for shorter periods.
In case of privatization of public work contracts, the contractors prefer mechanization and
the practice of importation of labour from the 'nakas' where casualized migrant labour
congregate. Rarely do they practice local hiring. Where limited local hiring still happens
for public works projects the shifting of such projects under EGS has meant a large decline
in the wage levels, in most cases to less than half the market wage rates. (According to the
GOM 2002 Human Development report, the average wage per day on EGS works in 2001-2002 was
Rs. 45.28, while the average daily wage for unskilled labour in the market is between
Rs.70-Rs. 80.
The prescribed minimum wage in the schedule is much higher e.g. for construction work is Rs.
128/day. This drop in wages effectively makes local State projects based employment
unsustainable as adequate income generation mechanisms for adivasis thus forcing an out
migration from their villages.
The co-terminus relationship of the growing insecurity of livelihoods on the one hand and
the factors of continued drought, the low productivity of land and the food distribution
infrastructure is notable.
The 1970s and 80s saw considerable efforts mainstream agricultural production
and increase the yield based on green revolution technology through subsidised seeds,
fertilizers and pesticides etc. However, this last decade has seen a significant drop in
such subsidies.
The conditions of continued drought that have persisted over the last two years has meant
that all prevalent stocks of food grain that an adivasi family would otherwise use, deplete,
forcing those with small to medium holdings to operate in a survival mode. The contribution
of the primary sector to the state domestic product was already as low as 21.2 per cent and
after a decline to 17.7 per cent in 1997-98 it stands today at 14.5 percent while the number
of persons dependent in agriculture is 65 per cent. In 2000-2001 the share of the primary
sector to the average annual growth of per capita state income fell to minus 11.8 percent.
(EGS report.) This figure would be much higher for tribal blocks.
The EGS has the distinction of being the largest as well as the oldest public works
programme in the developing world (Human Development Report 1993). However the actual
functioning of the scheme in tribal areas leaves a lot to be desired. Works are not planned
and started on time forcing starving tribals to migrate. A standard excuse by the
administration is that there is no demand for EGS works however every year tribal blocks
witness demonstrations of unemployed labourers demanding work. A cursory examination of EGS
records at the tribal block level often shows labour presence to be in excess of the man
days planned for, which means less work at lower wages for shorter periods. Often only one
member of a family is provided work which is in contravention of the law and work lasts for
a period as short as 2-4 days. In the last 15 years there has been no registration of
workers in spite of specific provisions in the law. (EGS report).
Aspects of adivasi migrant labour work
Adivasi migrant labour is employed in a whole host of industries where a combination of low
to no wages, deplorable working conditions and complete failure of the law creates
conditions of exploitation hitherto unknown in independent India. Salt pan works, brick
kilns, fishing boats and sugarcane cutting are some of the most prominent industries in
which adivasi migrant labour finds seasonal employment. As was said above very little
survey data exists on the conditions of such workers. Data used in this segment of the
report draws from one detailed survey of Salt Pans in Raigad district, Maharashtra, where a
total of 51 salt works were studied by the Additional Labour Commissioner as directed by the
High Court, Mumbai in response to a Public Interest Petition filed to ameliorate conditions
of work in salt pans and rampant practice of non payment of earned wages migrant tribal
workers subjecting them to seasonal bondage. In addition some data is drawn from the Salt
Commissioners records and a Labor File report.
According to the Salt Commissioner's record, there are a total of 178 salt works in the
State of Maharashtra in Thane, Mumbai, Raigad and Sindhudurg districts. These salt works
cover a land area of 19,650 acres, producing 1.5 lakh tones of salt valued at Rs. 9 Crores.
As per a Labor File report 90% of the labour employed in these 178 salt works are adivasis.
Of these salt works, 51 were surveyed in Raigad district in accordance with the orders of
the High Court in WP 343 of 2002. The findings of the survey are shocking.
It was found that of the 51 salt works surveyed, 38 paid less than 50% of the prescribed
minimum wage. All 13 of the salt works that were found to be paying minimum wage were small
works that only employed '2 or 3' local labourers and therefore paid minimum wage. In other
words, close to 75% of the salt works surveyed, all of which employed only adivasi migrant
labour were found to be in gross contravention of the law. The survey also concluded that
'the working conditions of the tribal migrant salt workers are excessive'. Further, the
assistant labour commissioner Raighad attested on affidavit that 'it is difficult to
ascertain the working hours of the day' and 'that none of the owners/conductors/lease
holders has provided safety equipment'. The failure of the law to enforce minimum wage
requirements and proper working conditions was also duly acknowledged by the survey:
The survey noted that a total of 26 prosecutions were lodged against employers for unfair
labour practices in salt works in Raighad district which had been disposed off with fines
totaling Rs. 23,600. This works out to approximately to Rs. 900 per employer while the gain
to the employer not paying minimum wages is in the range of lakhs of rupees.
The affidavit of the Assistant Labour Commissioner admitted with the survey in the High
Court noted that the 'ACL office is already overburdened' and therefore 'unable to proceed
as per the law'.
Other important facts that can be gleaned from the survey are that the employers do not
maintain any records and workers are often denied payment of earned wages; under conditions
of migrant labour it is difficult to prosecute and recover any wages.
The case above and details uncovered by the survey are indicative of the predicament of
adivasi migrant labour in the salt pans of Thane, Raigad and Sindhudurg. The
conditions in other industries employing seasonal migrant labour such as sugar cane cutting,
fishing and brick kilns are similar.
Practices of adivasi migrant labour
The practice of migrating out for work among adivasis has various inflections to how it is
constituted, in large part depending on the initial conditions that create the necessity to
migrate out for work. For instance, among those adivasi communities where lack of local
employment creates conditions where there is a cash shortage but where the families have not
entirely run out of food stocks etc, the tendency is for individual members to migrate out
for short periods so as to generate cash supplements to support their family. This form of
work is often referred to as 'for cash migration' (dhandhyala). In sharp contrast, when
adivasi families are reduced to abject poverty with no food stocks or other resources to
even tide over the short term, the whole family tends to migrate looking for survival. This
form is referred to as 'migration to survive' (Jagayla).
The former group though vulnerable has some buffer food stock, but require to migrate for cash particularly
to ensure medical aid incase of illness in the family. In families with some buffer food stock, it is the
men who migrate for shorter periods, women without young children also migrate, but the aged and mothers of
young children stay behind. In the latter, Jagayla type situation the cycles of exploitation are more
often far worse and continually cascading into new crises. In these cases, the family moves from its
village and the specific work place and type of work is something it has little control over because of the
need to survive. Often the levels of exploitation, non payment of wages, harassment and sexual violence
forces them to migrate further to a new place, often abandoning the claims over earnings they may have had.
Each such new place puts them in a more vulnerable situation producing a cycle of newer and sharper crises.
Often the levels of exploitation, non payment of wages, harassment and sexual violence
forces them to migrate further to a new place, often abandoning the claims over earnings they may have had.
Each such new place puts them in a more vulnerable situation producing a cycle of newer and sharper crises.
Within both these forms of work, there are further distinctions on how work is structured.
In the case of seasonal employment, often contractors/agents who serve the ownership of the
above mentioned industries enter adivasi villages during cultivation season and extend
consumption loans to those families that are in dire need of money to be repaid by work in
the ensuing season. The season of work stretches over 6 to 8 months. Wages are fixed in
terms of a lump sum amount - an oral agreement (thar) to be paid at the end of the season
after deducting the consumption loan advances taken during the period of work and a fixed
deduction for the leave taken. During this entire period the worker is paid paltry advances
for survival and earned wages are only paid at the end of the season. The lump sum payment
is approximately half the prescribed minimum wage. As for the conditions of work, there are
no fixed hours, no weekly offs, no safety gear etc. If a worker leaves employment mid season
due to illness or some other reason then he/she usually forfeits the earned wages.
The contrasting case where bondage doesn't fix a worker to one employer is the practice of
casualized seasonal work, where a worker migrates during the non agricultural season to
nearby urban centers and participates in the daily wage labour naka market and waits to be
picked up by an employer. The situation of these workers is most precarious and vulnerable.
Despite the severe exploitation, tribal migrant labourers consider seasonal bondage in salt
pans and brick kilns preferable to seasonal casualized labour as they are assured of
continuous work and daily food.
The occupations to which tribals migrate as casualized labour are on sand excavation sites,
as lorry hamals, for building construction, roads, cable laying, quarry works, as casual
labour in factories. The wages for these works are marginally higher than in occupations of
seasonal bondage. However, there is no assurance of continued work and no work often means
no food. The workers assemble at fixed spots (nakas) in urban centers where the contractors
seek them out and take them for work. Sometimes workers are picked up and transported to far
off places outside the district/state. During the last two years the numbers of these
workers has grown exponentially due to the drought. In addition a large number of tribal
migrants from Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh have joined the casual unorganized workers ranks in
Maharashtra.
As a result of this growing work force of disaggregate workers the actual wage rates have
fallen by Rs. 20 to 25 during the last year. (for e.g. Work for which the market wage rate
was Rs. 100 last year now fetches Rs. 70 to 80)
Though many of these employments are scheduled the given wage rate
is always below the minimum wage rate. The growth of the market is not in proportion with
the growing number of migrant workers and competition to get work is intensifying. This
translates to the phenomena of people migrating for longer periods and earning less. In
significant ways, it would not be incorrect to say that a good part of the infrastructure
for the new economy, such as cables and roads, are being put in place based on such migrant
labour, and migrant labour subsidizing the costs of liberalization and globalization..
But the lowering of actual wage rates is the least of the problems of this massive
disaggregate work force. They are totally at the mercy of unscrupulous contractors who pay
them paltry advances to meet their food expenses with a promise to settle their dues on
completion of the work. The workers have no clue as to the principal employer and it is not
uncommon for the contractor, who is often a fly-by-night operator, to disappear once the work
is done without paying the earned wages. Each year lakhs of migrant workers trek back home
after two or three months of work simply because they do not even have the money to pay for
their fare.
The failure of regulation
Any understanding of the causes for the continuation of such unyielding and hyper
exploitative practices is impossible without an examination of the infrastructure that is in
place to regulate and monitor employment and remunerative practices of employers. The said
infrastructure is both by way of State institutions and laws that are meant to together
constitute an apparatus of regulation.
Almost all labour in the brick kilns, salt pans, sand excavation and fishing boats
is 'forced labour'. The law is clear on this point. The payment of wages is an
absolute condition of employment. In the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) v. Union
Of India, the Supreme Court has held that requiring workers to work for less than Minimum Wages
is 'forced labour' as contemplated in Article 23 of the Constitution. 'Forced Labour' is a
criminal offence and an atrocity under 3(1)(vi) of the Prevention of Atrocities on Scheduled
Caste/Scheduled Tribe Act 1989 and the Sub Divisional Magistrate has been specifically
empowered to prevent atrocities under the rules framed under the Act. However, the critical
aspect of the criminal justice system's relation to adivasi migrant labour lies in the fact
that criminal matters such as non payment of wages and sexual harassment are never treated as
criminal offenses by the law enforcement mechanism.
The Labour Commission was set up with a mandate to adjudicate
disputes between workers and employers so as to protect the workers from undertaking lengthy and expensive
legal battles. The commission is perceived as a 'conciliatory' body wherein conciliation is understood as
both sides giving up some of their claims with scant consideration for the stipulation of the law. In the
case of migrant worker, the office of the Labour Commission is supposed to inspect and monitor their
conditions of work. However, the sheer scale of migrant labour, its disaggregation and the employers
determination to obstruct any inspection makes the task overwhelming. In addition the internal corruption
with the commission makes it very difficult to secure any meaningful justice through this mechanism.
The Labour courts are notorious for their backlog and for the length and cost of the procedures. However,
what works as the most effective deterrent for adivasi migrant labour in using the labour court system is
the requirement that all cases must be filed at the place of work rather than the place of home. This
effectively means that a worker has to travel back to his original place of work numerous times to pursue
the case. Protective Legislation such as Minimum Wages Act, Workmen's Compensation Act, Interstate Migrant
Labour Act, Abolition of Contract Labour Act are all followed in breach. Further, in the odd case where
the worker does get an award after a prolonged legal battle, the award is rarely implemented.
There still are many employments which have not been included in the list of Scheduled
employments and industries where the minimum wage has not been revised or has been fixed
much below the going market wage. For instance, the agricultural Minimum Wage in Maharashtra
is much lower than that of most other states. With the absence of a normative justice
framework for redressal of complaints and with the Labour Department having failed
abysmally in its task to protect migrant workers there is little negotiation space for this
already marginalized section of the workforce.
The most effective deterrent for adivasi migrant labour in using the labour court system is
the requirement that all cases must be filed at the place of work rather than the place of home. This
effectively means that a worker has to travel back to his original place of work numerous times to pursue
the case.
In every tribal area the Integrated Tribal Development Project has been set up for the
welfare needs and development of the tribal people. There is a need to empower the ITDP
Department to protect the rights of migrant tribal workers. As the Revenue department is
the license issuing authority for many rural industries, if suitably empowered, it can be
effective in the recovery of the wages of unpaid workers. Non Payment of Minimum Wages
should be made a cognizable offence and be brought under the purview of Section 374 of the
Indian Penal Code as Unlawful Compulsory Labour. The redressal of complaints like non
payment of wages and sexual exploitation should be done at a government office nearest to
the place of residence of the worker and not necessarily the site of employment. There ought
to be regulation of the unfair labour practices through the presence of a labour inspector
at all 'nakas' from where casual labour is recruited with a display board of Minimum Wages
for different employments and provision should be made for registration of migrant labour
with the Gram Panchayats. There is also a need for Mobile Labour Courts or additional powers
to be given to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class to try labour matters.
The phenomena of adivasi migrant labour is positioned to grow rapidly over the next decade
unless a series of corrective/preventive measures are taken. Such measures can be
conceptualized at either end of the phenomena of migrant labour and the very creation of
such a 'disaggregated' labour force that is fragmented, disempowered and highly marginalized
is minimised. However, simultaneously efforts to create a new and aggressive regulation
mechanism that seeks to discipline the ownership of said industries is needed.
Shiraz Bulsara and Priyadarshini Sreenivasa
Shiraz Bulsara and Priyadarshini Sreenivasa are activists of the Kamgar va Mazdoor Sangh, a
union of unorganised workers.
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